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Abstract
This paper studies how the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) regime in destina-
tion countries influences the way multinationals structure the international organi-
zation of their production. In particular, we explore how multinationals divide tasks
of different complexities across countries with different levels of IPR protection. The
analysis studies the decision of firms between procurement from related parties and
outsourcing to independents suppliers at the product level. It also breaks down
outsourcing into two types by distinguishing whether or not they involve technology
sharing between the two parties. We combine data from a French firm-level survey
on the mode choice for each transaction with a newly developed complexity mea-
sure at the product level. Our results confirm that firms are generally reluctant to
source highly complex goods from outside firm boundaries. By studying the inter-
action between product complexity and the IPR protection, we obtain that (i) for
technology-sharing-outsourcing IPRs promote outsourcing of more complex goods
to a destination country by guaranteeing the protection of their technology, (ii)
for non-technology-related-outsourcing IPRs attract the outsourcing of less complex
products that are more prone to reverse engineering and simpler to decodify and
imitate.
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1 Introduction
In a global survey of senior executives conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 84
percent of all respondents state that they perceive the lack of Intellectual Property Rights
(IPRs) protection in emerging markets as a challenge when outsourcing their R&D (The
Economist Intelligence Unit Report, 2004). This qualifies IPR protection as the biggest
challenge of globalized R&D among all factors listed. Yet, we continue to see actions
and decisions by top managers of successful enterprises that contradict these figures.
An example is Apple, the company known for boasting that its machines are “made in
the USA”. In 2007, it decided to outsource the production of its unscratchable glass for
i-phone and i-pad, to a plant in China. Today, “almost all of the 70 million iPhones,
30 million iPads and 59 million other products Apple sold last year were manufactured
overseas” (New York Times, 21 January 2012). Apple’s shift, or better revolution, in
its organizational approach has drawn a great deal of curiosity in the business world.
The company is said to be breaking a taboo by outsourcing and transferring its intel-
lectual property to competitors and countries that have a history of stealing good ideas.
Are IPRs truly essential to outsourcing decisions, and if so how do they influence the
organizational mode through which multinational firms source inputs?
The aim of this research is to take a step in understanding the equivocal connec-
tion between IPRs and outsourcing by breaking down products into different levels of
complexity and outsourcing into two types by distinguishing whether or not they involve
technology sharing between the two parties. A series of influential papers on firm orga-
nization highlight the choice faced by firms between purchasing from an affiliate or from
an independent supplier, where the latter gives rise to a hold-up problem when contracts
are incomplete (see Antràs and Helpman, 2004, 2008 among others). The availability of
firm-level data has pushed the literature forward to study the concept of heterogeneity
not only among firms, but also in terms of products or tasks embedded in their produc-
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tion. Grover (2007) interacts the intensity of the sourced input with technology transfer
costs and shows that the results from Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) only hold for a
certain range of technological complexity of the input. More in line with our approach,
Costinot et al. (2011) reinterpret the source of contractual frictions as arising from the
non-routineness of tasks. Since these cannot be fully specified ex-ante, ex-post adapta-
tion becomes necessary. Due to better communication and less opportunistic behavior
among affiliated parties, outsourcing only takes place for tasks below a certain complex-
ity threshold. Focusing on the relation between technology and the outsourcing decision,
the message is clear: higher technology complicates the relation with the supplier and
makes it optimal to vertically integrate.
Despite the clear findings on the relation between outsourcing and technological com-
plexity, the role of IPR protection as a determinant of outsourcing upper parts of the
value chain has attracted little attention in the economic literature. Indeed, Antràs and
Rossi-Hansberg (2009) suggest that past literature has focused too much on hold-up inef-
ficiencies as the main drivers of the internalization decision and underline the importance
of the effects of the non-appropriable nature of knowledge on the internalization decision
of firms. Does the IPR regime play the same institutional role as contractual enforcement
when outsourcing goods embodied with more complex tasks? A limited number of earlier
studies have investigated the impact of IPR protection on outsourcing (see e.g. Glass,
2004). This branch of literature, however, treats imitation in the destination country as
an equal threat for all goods and is therefore only testable at the aggregate level. This
makes it impossible to study the interaction between IPR protection and task complexity
as a determinant of the organization of multinationals.
This paper tries to fill in this gap by studying how the IPR regime influences the way
multinationals structure the international organization of their production. In particular,
it sheds light on how multinationals divide tasks of different complexities across countries
with different levels of IPR protection. A multinational active in a given country can
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choose to source an intermediate good from a related party or from independent suppliers.
The outsourcing contract could be an alliance that involves technology sharing, or pure
procurement of parts from a supplier. In contrast to the existing studies, we depart from
the hold-up problem and emphasize the role of the prevailing IPR regime in the host
country in multinationals’ international portfolio of tasks. We test existing theoretical
explanations to see whether multinationals are induced to keep technologically complex
tasks in the circle of related parties within firm boundaries. Moreover, we check whether
a stronger IPR regime in a given country encourages a multinational to procure its
intermediates from a foreign independent supplier.
But does a stronger IPR regime in a host country encourage multinationals to out-
source more complex tasks to foreign independent suppliers? The response is not obvious.
Intermediates requiring more complex tasks are more difficult to copy and reproduce and
therefore create less infringement concerns. We therefore expect IPR protection to be
more crucial for outsourcing (easily imitable) less complex goods. A firm can however
still lose information and profits when it intentionally shares technology with its partner
and IPR protection is low or absent. In this case intermediates containing a more com-
plex technology are especially sensitive and can be associated with a larger loss in the
case of imitation. IPR protection here mitigates imitation risk and promotes outsourcing
of more complex goods. To test the validity of the above channels, we study the inter-
action between the IPR regime in a host country and the complexity of tasks required
in the production of intermediates in determining the decision of multinationals on the
organization of their production. Evidence on the two opposing effects of complexity
on the need for IPR protection was first introduced in Mansfield (1994) who surveyed
100 major US firms with international operations in 1991. He suggested that although
more technologically sophisticated industries place a larger emphasis on IPRs, those that
require complex inputs are protected from imitation and may therefore be unaffected by
IPRs.
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We empirically examine the choice between intra-firm trade and outsourcing by com-
bining firm-level data on the mode choice for each transaction with a newly developed
complexity measure at the product-level. The complexity of a product group is derived by
merging three different data sets, (i) ratings of occupations by their intensities in ‘prob-
lem solving’ from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network,
(ii) employment shares of occupations by sectors from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Occupational Employment Statistics and (iii) French make tables from Eurostat. The
firm-level data comes from a French survey which provides information on import trans-
actions at the product-level of multinational firms and their sourcing mode by country.
This information is merged with balance sheet and income statement data from which
we compute firm-level productivity. The French data have the advantage of dealing with
firms that are part of a multinational network. This allows us to explore the decision of
firms with a related party in a given country whether or not to acquire their different
inputs from foreign outside suppliers. We argue that this choice is influenced by the
complexity level of the tasks involved in the production of the sourced products and the
IPR regime in the host country. Conceptually, such data allows us to study how IPRs
affect each firm differently rather than the widely studied hypothesis that there are fewer
arms-length transactions in countries with weak IPRs. 1
In line with the previous literature, our baseline results suggest that multinationals
tend to outsource less complex goods from foreign independent suppliers. These findings
confirm that firms are generally reluctant to source highly complex goods from outside
firm boundaries. The level of IPRs however does not affect the outsourcing share of
inputs with an average level of complexity. We then analyze the interaction between
IPR protection and product complexity and find that more complex tasks mitigate the
need for IPRs when outsourcing to independent suppliers. Firms tend to outsource more
1In other words, we study the decision of multinationals on the intensive margin (what proportion
of their products to source from independent suppliers in a given country) rather than the extensive
margin (whether to use integration versus outsourcing in different countries).
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complex products in countries with relatively less stringent IPR regimes as complexity
itself provides a shelter against reverse engineering of goods that are simpler to decodify
and imitate. This provides an explanation for the recent behavior by Apple with respect
to the outsourcing of some of its most complex tasks to countries with poor records of
IPR enforcement.
Using the information on the sample of transactions from external suppliers for a
more in-depth study of the interaction between product complexity and the IPR pro-
tection in the sourcing country, we next look at the type of outsourcing to see whether
sharing information on technology has an impact on the outsourcing behavior of firms.
Confirming the baseline results, we find a negative and significant interaction term in
the sample of outsourced imports from external suppliers without technology sharing.
The share of outsourcing of more complex inputs is therefore larger in countries with
lower levels of IPRs because of the lower imitation possibilities. We however find a posi-
tive interaction term in the sample of transactions that require technology sharing. The
share of outsourcing of more complex inputs is therefore larger from countries with a
stronger IPR regime when the transactions require technology sharing. IPRs protect
firms from the risk of losing their technology (or having it used against their interest),
the value of which increases with the level of complexity. In other words, in a weak IPR
environment, costly intangible assets embodied in complex goods can only be effectively
protected against imitation within firm boundaries. We can therefore conclude that (i)
for technology-sharing-outsourcing IPR protection promotes outsourcing of more com-
plex goods to a destination country by guaranteeing the protection of their technology,
(ii) for non-technology-related outsourcing more IPR protection attracts the outsourcing
of less complex products that are more prone to imitation.
Our work is most closely related to Ivus (2010, 2012), who takes the opposite perspec-
tive and investigates the impact of improved IPRs in the destination country on exports.
She finds that patent protection increases the value of exports from developed to devel-
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oping countries in patent-sensitive industries, especially for industries that rely heavily
on patent protection (Ivus, 2010). This work is extended to differentiate between exports
at the intensive and the extensive margin (existing and new products respectively) to
find a shift from the former to the latter caused by stronger IPRs (Ivus, 2012). Another
closely related paper is Canals and Sener (2012), who study the impact of IPR reform on
US offshoring decisions using a measure based on intermediate goods trade. They find
that intra-industry offshoring in high-tech industries is most influenced by IPR reforms.
Data availability restricts their analysis to industry-level observations and to 16 receiving
countries. We take the analysis to a more disaggregate level by looking at the outsourc-
ing decision at the firm-level for products of different complexities to 99 countries. In
addition, our data allows us to distinguish between different types of outsourcing by ob-
serving whether or not they involve technology sharing. Only such distinction allows us
to detect the dual character of product complexity on imitation risk.
Considered from a different perspective, our results are also consistent with Branstet-
ter et al. (2006) in that stronger IPRs in a host country stimulate (direct) technology
transfer by multinational firms. Finally, related empirical works on complexity include
Berkowitz et al. (2006), who show that higher quality legal institutions located in the
exporter’s country enhance international trade in complex products. They argue this to
be due to a production cost effect, assuming that the production of complex products
contains some degree of outsourcing, and hence depends on contracts. Better institutions
enable the exporting country to cheaply and quickly enforce contracts and resolve busi-
ness disputes by reducing the likelihood of hold-up on the production chain. This in turn
lowers the production costs of complex products. Since these issues are less important
for simple goods, better legal institutions enhance a country’s comparative advantage
in complex goods. While Berkowitz et al. (2006) deals with contractual complications
of business transactions involving complex products, we explore the relevance of IPRs
and the appropriability of knowledge for the type of trade (intra- versus extra-group)
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undertaken by a multinational with an exporting country. In addition, we use a specific
measure of complexity based on the routineness of tasks that is more adequate for our
aim to differentiate products with respect to their technology content.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework, Sections 3 and 4 introduce the data, methodology, and the empirical analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We start by developing a simple theoretical framework, which helps us pin down the main
idea. Consider a multinational firm that has already born the fixed cost of being active
in a country j ∈ {1..J}. The firm can import intermediate or final goods from a related
party (insource) or an independent supplier (outsource): X ∈ {I,O}. A two-dimensional
source of heterogeneity drives the decision of a multinational: countries are heterogeneous
with respect to the level of IPR protection, λj ; products are heterogeneous with respect
to the complexity of tasks required in their fabrication, z. In particular, 0 < z(ω) < ∞
is a continuous measure of technological complexity embodied in a product ω.
As familiar in the literature, multinational firms face a trade-off when selecting their
mode of procurement. Outsourcing (O) brings specialization gains that generally trans-
late into marginal cost savings, whereas insourcing (I) carries advantages through lower
initial fixed costs Antràs and Helpman, 2004. We view this latter from the perspective
that the production of complex goods outside firm boundaries requires a fixed customiza-
tion cost T (z(ω)). This can be thought of as training costs and the effort required to
achieve a better fit of the independent supplier’s production to the multinational firm’s
needs. We assume that the customization costs are increasing in complexity, ∂T (.)∂z(ω) > 0.
Outsourcing also entails a risk of imitation. Such losses can either come from reverse
2Berkowitz et al. (2006) uses the Rauch (1999) classification to distinguish between simple and com-
plex products.
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engineering performed on the product (or input) itself by the supplier, or when the
multinational shares its technology with the independent supplier. The extent of the
loss from these channels depends on the level of IPR protection in the host country. We
parameterize the costs associated with imitation as
rj(ω) = λjz(ω)
δ− 1
2 (1)
where 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1 is the inverse measure of IPR protection and δ ∈ {0, 1} represents
the type of outsourcing. A lower λj indicates a stronger IPR regime in the host country,
where λj = 0 denotes a country with full protection and λj = 1 one with no protection.
Parameter δ on the other hand is a dummy variable where δ = 1 if outsourcing involves
technology sharing and δ = 0 if it is characterized as a pure procurement of products
(inputs). Less complex products are easier to copy. Therefore complexity itself works
as a shield against the infringement making IPRs less relevant for more complex goods.
However, a firm can still lose its technology if its knowledge is openly shared with the
outsourcing partner. Potential losses from imitation are thus increasing in product com-
plexity when a multinational shares its technology in the outsourcing contract. In this
case, the contents can be used to compete against the multinational and the damage is
higher the more complex and profitable is the technology. This would of course only
be possible when IPR protection is low or absent. In sum, losses from imitation are
decreasing in complexity when δ = 0 and increasing when δ = 1 making IPRs a concern
for less complex goods when δ = 0 and for more complex goods when δ = 1.
We can represent the total profits under outsourcing in a general form as:
ΠX (z(ω), λj , δ) = piX (rj(ω), cX)− T (z(ω)), (2)
for X ∈ {I,O}, where piO (rj(ω), cO) represents operating profits when outsourcing to
an independent supplier is the organizational mode. Imitation by local competitors steals
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a share of the market for a specific good from the multinational reducing their operating
profits. At the same time outsourcing is generally accompanied by specialization gains
that translate into marginal cost savings, so that cO < cI . As a result, firms face a trade-
off between higher imitation risk and lower unit costs. We assume insourcing to be the
alternative organization that entails higher unit costs, but protects the multinational from
imitation since they own property rights over a product (or input) and the technology
used in their own affiliate. In addition, fixed costs T (z(ω)) are higher under outsourcing
due to higher customization costs when dealing with an outside supplier.
The multinational decides to outsource product ω with complexity level z(ω) to a
country with IPR protection λj if and only if ΠO (z(ω), λj , δ) > ΠI (z(ω)) in Equation
(2). The probability of outsourcing is therefore determined by the product and country
specific characteristics of the transaction. Note that a multinational can source different
inputs from a country j using different organizational modes. A firm may for instance
outsource the production of its less complex inputs, but insource more complex inputs
or vice versa.
Looking back at Equation (1), losses from imitation are increasing in the level of
complexity, ∂rj(ω)∂z(ω) > 0, if δ = 1, and decreasing,
∂rj(ω)
∂z(ω) < 0, if δ = 0. Property −1 <
δ− 12 < 1 results in imitation risk being concave in complexity when technology is shared
and convex for pure procurement of goods. That is, imitation risk of very complex goods
approaches zero, while there is a maximum loss that can come from imitation when
technology is shared. Seen the other way around, a simple good entails no losses from
technology sharing and an infinite loss due to imitation (under no IPR protection) that
could result in perfect competition and zero operating profits.
To see the importance of IPR protection for different complexity levels, we first note
that, ∆j(ω) ≡ ∂rj(ω)∂λj > 0. It is easy to see from Equation (1) that
∆j(ω)
∂λj
|δ=0< 0, while
∆j(ω)
∂λj
|δ=1> 0. On the one hand, complex goods are more difficult to imitate, increasing
the need for IPR protection for less complex goods. On the other hand, outsourcing more
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complex goods involve higher potential losses when the technology shared leaks, hence
increasing the importance of IPRs. The relationship between IPR protection and product
complexity therefore goes both directions and could be ambiguous when considering all
transactions. Given the functional form of losses from imitation in (1), all else equal it is
likely that the first effect dominates since rj(ω) |δ=0,z→0> rj(ω) |δ=1,z→∞ making IPRs
more crucial for less complex goods on the aggregate.
The empirical exercise in the next section aims to test the above hypothesis by inves-
tigating whether (1) firms are in general reluctant to outsource complex goods to inde-
pendent suppliers, (2) IPR protection is more crucial for the simpler products (inputs)
when outsourcing does not involve technology sharing, (3) IPR protection is effective
in encouraging outsourcing more complex goods more when the multinational shares its
technology with the foreign supplier.
3 Data
Data on the Organization of French multinationals The empirical analysis uses
a detailed firm-level survey of French multinationals containing information about the
organization of their international production. The survey has been conducted by the
French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) for 1999. It is
limited to firms that trade more than one million Euro and to industrial cross-border
transactions. The firms in the survey account for 64% of French imports of manufactured
goods.
The survey enquires about the country of origin of the transaction and the imported
products. It reports moreover the value of imports from foreign related parties and from
foreign independent suppliers.3 We use this information to construct at the level of firm
i, the share of imports of product p that is sourced from an independent supplier located
3The foreign related parties are direct foreign affiliates of French firms or belong to the group which
owns the French firm.
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in country j. We denote this share by Yipj =
MOipj
(MOipj+MIipj)
with O and I indicating the
outsourcing and intra-firm modes of imports, respectively.
Importantly, the data also contains information on whether or not the relationship
between the French multinational and the supplier requires technology sharing. The
survey specifies if the outsourcing relationship involves technological alliances, licensing,
franchising, and works on plan but no information concerning the amount of imports
falling within these subcategories is provided. Instead, a single number reports the total
value of imports from independent suppliers that involve technology sharing at the level
of the firm, product and country. Our dependent variable, Yipj , is the sum of the two
shares of outsourcing – with and without technology sharing. Table 6 in the Appendix
shows that while on average 78% of imports are sourced from independent suppliers, only
2% of these imports involve technology sharing.
The survey does not provide information on the characteristics of the imported prod-
ucts, and in particular on whether these are intermediate inputs. Our theoretical hy-
pothesis concerns goods that enter the production process as intermediate inputs. We
identify the type of product in the sample using the methodology proposed by Feenstra
and Hanson (1996). They define the value of imported inputs as the value of goods that
are sourced from a different sector than the sector of the firm. We apply this definition
to the product categories in the French database.4
Table 1 reports the number of firms, products and countries in both estimation sam-
ples. The intermediate input sample covers 2580 manufacturing firms, 32 product cat-
egories and 89 countries. The full sample is composed of 2915 firms which import 32
product categories from 99 countries. The total number of observations is 39711. The
construction of the intermediate inputs sample eliminates about a third of the total num-
4The value of imported inputs is therefore defined as the value of all transactions that are classified
in a 2-digit sector different from the one of the French multinational. Working at the 2-digit level is
necessary to match the level of aggregation of the complexity measure. The empirical measure of the
value of imported inputs is therefore rather conservative.
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ber of observations. While the average product complexity is the same in both samples,
the outsourcing share is slightly lower and the average IPR level slightly higher in the
sample of intermediate inputs.
Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Number of: Intermediate Inputs Full Sample
Firms 2609 2915
Product 32 32
Countries 89 99
Average Share of Outsourcing 0.77 0.79
Average IPR level 4.21 4.15
Average Product Complexity 0.26 0.26
Observations 25077 39711
A Task-Based Product Complexity Measure Our measure of product complexity
is similar to Costinot et al. (2011) and Keller and Yeaple (2009). We construct for each
product category an index that informs about about the content of tasks that require
complex problem solving skills. Data on complex solving skills are taken from the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET). Similar data are
not available for France. As it is common in the literature, we assume therefore that
the factor content in complex solving skills of a particular product category is the same
across countries.
The O*NET data contain expert information on the level and importance of complex
problem solving skills for 809 8-digit occupations as defined in the Standard Occupational
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Classification (SOC).5 Each occupation, o, embodies a complexity of
zo = i
0.25
o + l
0.75
o (3)
where the weights give the contributions of the two complexity components, importance
i ∈ [1, 5] and level l ∈ [0, 7].6 Higher values correspond to a higher “importance” or
“level” of skills. The difference between “importance” and “level” can best be understood
with an example. The subtask “problem identification” has an importance of 3 for both
purchasing managers and vessel inspectors. Since purchasing managers are more often
confronted with the task of identifying problems, they are assigned a level score of 4.2
whereas vessel inspectors are assigned a 2.8 only. The resulting single score is therefore
higher for purchasing managers.
After combining the two components into a single complexity score for each occupa-
tion, we derive the complexity embodied in each industry. To this end, we use information
on the employment of the different occupations by industry. In line with Costinot et al.
(2011), we assume that every country in the sample uses the same technology and rely
therefore on employment information from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupa-
tional Employment Statistics (OES). The 1999 data contains the number of employees
by occupation in every 3-digit industry k (according to the Standard Industrial Classifi-
5Since the skill-content of occupations may change over time, we use version 3.0 of the O*NET
database, released in 2000, to match the data on French multinationals. Note that this version still
distinguishes eight categories, namely “problem identification”, “information gathering”, “information or-
ganization”, “synthesis/reorganization”, “idea generation”, “idea evaluation”, “implementation planning”,
“solution appraisal”, which have been from version 4.0 on summarized into a single category “complex
problem solving skills” (Boese and Lewis, 2001).
6We normalized the different scales of the complexity components to a [0, 1] scale using the min-max
method, I = io−min(i)
max(i)−min(i)
(
L = lo−min(l)
max(l)−min(l)
)
. The weighting scheme is the same as in Jensen and
Kletzer (2010). We have tried different weights that have been used in the literature (see also Blinder,
2009) without any effect on the results.
13
cation, SIC).7 The occupational intensity, bko , of each industry is then given by
bko =
Lko∑
o L
k
, (4)
where Lko is the employment level of occupation o in industry k. Although the SIC
provides information on products or services which are generated under the same industry
heading, it does not relate atypical (or secondary) products. In order to compute the
skill content embodied in primary and secondary outputs of each industry, we employ
a make table for France from 1999 (provided by Eurostat). This allows us to derive a
precise complexity measure at the product-level,8
zp(ω) =
∑
k∈p
xk(ω)∑
k x(ω)
(
zob
k
o
)
, (5)
where x
k(ω)∑
k x(ω)
gives the share of industry k in the production of each product. Table
4 in Appendix summarizes the 32 product categories in our sample ranked according to
their complexity.
Intellectual Property Rights and Other Controls We use a measure of IPR pro-
tection from Park (2008) for the countries of origin available in our sample. This measure
of IPR protection is the updated version of the worldwide used Ginarte and Park index
(Ginarte and Park, 1997). It incorporates the effects of the TRIPS agreements of 1995
and it takes into account the revisions in national patent laws required to conform to
international and regional agreements (such as the North American free trade agreement
(NAFTA), European patent convention (EPC), African Regional industrial property or-
ganization (ARIPO), Cartagena agreement, among others). All the technical details
related to the construction of the index are in Park (2008). We measure the strength of
7Crop production, animal production and private households are not surveyed. After matching the
O*NET data to the OES data, 695 occupations remain in the sample.
8Since direct concordance tables of the NACE Rev. 1.1 classification and the SIC 1987 classification
are not available, correspondence is achieved via the NAICS 2002 classification. We use simple average
to go from the 3-digit level of the SIC to the 2-digit of the NACE.
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IPR protection in 1995 which is available for the 99 countries of the full sample. The
variable is transformed into logs. Table 5 in the Appendix summarizes the information
for the countries of our sample.
The cross-country rankings of IPRs tend to be correlated with other development-
related variables such as rule of law or the level of corruption.9 In this case, we attribute
some effects to the IPR level while they might be driven by other country characteristics.
We therefore introduce other development related variables in the estimation. We control
first for the rule of law. The variable measures the independence of the judiciary and the
extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters. It is taken from the
Freedom in the World database. We also control for the level of corruption by including
a measure that is taken from the Heritage Foundation database.10 Because the strength
of IPR enforcement varies with the overall level of economic development, we include
per-capita GDPs in the estimation. The data are taken from the Penn World Tables.
We include other explanatory variables that might influence the sourcing decision such
as market size, as the number of potential suppliers is larger/thicker in foreign markets
(McLaren (2000); Grossman and Helpman (2002)). We also include the distance between
the location of the French firm and the countries of origin of the imports to control for the
overall monitoring and trade costs (Mugele and Schnitzer, 2006; Ottaviano and Turrini
(2007)). Table 6 in the Appendix summarizes information related to the means and
standard deviations of the variables used in the estimations.
Estimation Methodology Our analysis draws inferences on the impact of IPR and
input complexity on the organization of international production. More crucially, our
theoretical framework suggests that the share of outsourcing is jointly determined by the
9The correlation between the IPR level and the development-related variables is above 75% as seen
in Table 7 in the Appendix.
10This indicator is based on the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International and
assessments of the US Department of Commerce, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Office of US Trade
Representative and official government publications of each country.
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level of IPR and the product complexity. We introduce thus an interaction term between
the product complexity and the IPR level in our empirical analysis.
Several characteristics of the data aid in the empirical identification strategy. First, a
single French multinational firm often imports different inputs from different countries.11
We use the variation in the countries of origin and imported inputs within each firm to
identify which product is outsourced, controlling for firm fixed effects. The introduction
of firm-level fixed effects helps moreover controlling for all unobserved firm-level charac-
teristics that might influence the sourcing decision. We estimate the baseline equation
using a linear probability model.
yijp = λ1IPRj + λ2Compp + λ3 (IPRj × Compp) (6)
+ Controlsj + νi + ijp
All estimations include a set of firm specific effects, νi. The standard errors are allowed
to be adjusted for clustering at the country-product-level to account for heteroskedasticity
and non-independence across the repeated observations within firms.12
4 Results
Baseline Results Table 2 presents our basic results for the outsourcing share in the
intermediate input sample. The empirical model includes firm-specific effects. In Ap-
pendix A.2, we present and briefly discuss the results of a model that substitutes the
firm-specific effects with the firm-level variables commonly used in the literature. Both
the IPR and the complexity variables have been centered around their mean. From
column (1) to (3), we include the level of IPR protection, product complexity and the
11Firms in the intermediate inputs sample import on average five product categories from about eight
countries.
12This level of clustering is chosen as a benchmark. For robustness we have nonetheless also considered
a two-way clustering of the errors at the product- and country-level. The results remain similar.
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interaction term. In column (4) we introduce other country-level characteristics that
may independently impact the outsourcing share, namely the rule of law, corruption, per
capita GDP, market size and distance between the home and the host country. Finally,
column (5) presents the estimates for the full sample of products.
The coefficient of the IPR variable is statistically not significant, suggesting that the
IPRs do not affect the oustourcing share of inputs with an average level of complexity.
Looking at the complexity measure, we find a negative and significant effect on the
outsourcing decision of multinationals. The negative coefficient of the product complexity
variable implies a lower outsourcing share for more complex inputs imported from a
country with an average level of IPR protection. A one-standard-deviation increase
in the complexity coefficient reduces the share of outsourcing by roughly 2.3 percentage
points. Corcos et al. (2012) complement these results by providing evidence that complex
goods and inputs are more likely to be produced within firm boundaries. Note however
that the statistical significance of this effect disappears once we include the full sample
of products. Our results suggest that the importance of product complexity is limited to
the sourcing of inputs.
Turning to the interaction term, looking across each specification in Table 2 reveals
strong evidence that the share of outsourcing of complex inputs is smaller in countries
with a stronger IPR regime. The negative interaction term is robust and remains sig-
nificant throughout the different specifications, even after controlling for other country-
level characteristics. These findings can be interpreted as evidence for a larger share of
outsourcing of complex inputs because of the lower imitation possibilities. Complexity
works as a shield against reverse engineering mitigating the importance of IPR protec-
tion. Firms therefore outsource less complex products (and inputs) that are easier to
decodify and imitate to independent suppliers in countries with relatively strong IPR
regimes.
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Table 2: Baseline results
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5)
IPRj -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.035 -0.040
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025)
Compp -0.184*** -0.177*** -0.169*** -0.010
(0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.065)
IPRj × Compp -0.404** -0.374* -0.540***
(0.201) (0.200) (0.196)
Rule of Lawj 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Corruptionj 0.004* 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Per Capita GDPj 0.005 0.002
(0.011) (0.011)
Market Sizej 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Distanceij -0.012*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
Firm-level FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Inputs Inputs Inputs Inputs Full
Observations 25,077 25,077 25,077 25,077 39,711
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.584 0.584 0.584 0.517
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-product identity. Standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Main Results In the evidence presented so far, we have explored how the interaction
between product complexity and the IPR regime affects the share of arms length trade
without distinguishing between the type of outsourcing. The French firm-level data al-
lows us take a step further and distinguish between the type of relationship that links
French firms with their foreign suppliers. To do this, we use the information provided on
whether or not an outsourcing relation involves technology sharing to analyze whether
this has an impact on the outsourcing behavior of firms in our sample. The results are
reported in Table 3. Columns (1-2) report the results corresponding to the sample of
transactions from external suppliers classified as pure procurement of parts from a sup-
plier without technology sharing, while columns (3-4) present the results using the sample
of transactions that involve sharing information on the technology of multinational firms.
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Table 3: Outsourcing with and without technology sharing
External Supplier
Without Technology Sharing With Technology Sharing
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
IPRj -0.015 -0.047* -0.003 0.012
(0.014) (0.026) (0.005) (0.008)
Compp -0.161*** -0.152*** -0.016 -0.017
(0.050) (0.046) (0.013) (0.013)
IPRj × Compp -0.563*** -0.531*** 0.159** 0.156**
(0.202) (0.201) (0.071) (0.071)
Rule of Lawj 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Corruptionj 0.004* -0.000
(0.003) (0.001)
Per Capita GDPj 0.013 -0.008*
(0.011) (0.005)
Market Sizej 0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Distanceij -0.014*** 0.002**
(0.004) (0.001)
Firm-level FE yes yes yes yes
Sample Inputs Inputs Inputs Inputs
25,077 25,077 25,077 25,077
0.592 0.593 0.543 0.543
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-product identity. Standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Confirming the baseline results, we find a negative and significant interaction term in
the sample of outsourced imports from external suppliers without technology sharing.13
The share of outsourcing of more complex inputs is therefore larger in countries with lower
levels of IPR because of the lower imitation possibilities and therefore less infringement
concerns. We however find a positive interaction term in the sample of transactions that
require technology sharing. The share of outsourcing of more complex inputs is therefore
larger from countries with a stronger IPR regime when the transactions require technol-
13The regression models estimated in Table 3 generate similar goodness-of-fit results regardless of the
sample; note that the Adjusted R2 is nearly the same across the different specifications presented in
Tables 2 and 3.
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ogy sharing. IPRs protect firms from the risk of losing their technology, the value of
which rises with complexity. Complex inputs involve costly R&D efforts that are likely
to be more effectively protected against imitation within firm boundaries. Due to the
greater amount of intangible assets embodied in complex goods, outsourcing to foreign
independent suppliers is only a profitable option if the IPR regime is sufficiently strong
to protect firms against the dissipation of their technology. This result is consistent with
the alternative property-rights explanation in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990) provided by Carluccio and Fally (2012), who find that multi-
nationals are more likely to integrate suppliers of more complex inputs that are located
in countries with poor financial institutions. They argue this to be an attempt by multi-
nationals to reduce exposure to opportunism in countries where financial development is
low.
The results after splitting the sample according to the two outsourcing types con-
firm our conceptual framework and provide novel results. First, for technology-sharing-
outsourcing IPR protection promotes outsourcing of more complex goods by mitigating
the risk of imitation, thereby guaranteeing the protection of their technology. Second,
for outsourcing contracts that do not require technology sharing, more IPR protection
attracts the outsourcing of less complex products that are more prone to imitation. This
is the first work to our knowledge that encompasses the dual role of complexity and the
role of IPRs in protecting intangible assets introduced in Mansfield (1994). Although
more technologically sophisticated industries place a larger emphasis on IPRs, those that
require complex inputs are automatically protected from imitation making IPRs instead
more important for easily imitable goods. Finally, it is worth noting that the direct
effect of product complexity is not significant in the technology sharing sample. The
level of product complexity hence does not matter for the inputs that are imported from
an average IPR country. We find moreover a positive effect of distance on the sourc-
ing share of inputs from external suppliers with technology sharing. In line with the
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transaction-costs literature (e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1985), this finding suggests higher
monitoring costs when the relationship requires technology sharing making arms length
trade a more desirable option. Finally, we find a negative coefficient for the per capita
GDP variable suggesting a lower share of outsourcing to less developed countries.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the decision of multinational firms in the sourcing of prod-
ucts of different complexity levels. The analysis has proposed and tested the hypothe-
sis that technological complexity of a product and the level of IPR protection are the
co-determinants of the sourcing mode of multinational firms. As measures of the tech-
nological intensity at the product-level are not available, we have built a new measure
reflecting the complex problem-solving skills involved in the production of a good. The
estimations confirm the predictions made about firms’ decision between intra-firm trade
and procurement from independent suppliers.
The results first shed light on the significance of IPRs given the nature of products or
inputs. In contrast to conventional wisdom, IPRs tend to play a more important role in
the outsourcing of simple goods. Our explanation for this result relies on the hypothesis
offered by Mansfield (1994) that complexity may work as a self-defense mechanism against
the infringement of goods. In addition, the availability of a rich French firm- and product-
level data has made it possible to conduct the first study on multinationals and IPRs that
distinguishes between outsourcing transactions by whether or not they involve technology
sharing. Doing so reveals that firms recognize IPRs as an important factor in their
decision regarding the location of outsourcing, when the contract involves technology
transfer. Only in this case, firms outsource highly complex products to countries where
their intellectual property is recognized. Here IPRs work to protect a multinational
against the dissipation of their knowledge-based intangible assets.
As much as the paper contributes to understanding the internationalization strategy
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of firms and the differences between intra-firm trade and outsourcing, it bears an impor-
tant policy conclusion: The results suggest that attracting the upper part of the value
chain requires building trust into the protection of IPRs.
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A IPR and Complexity Ranking
A.1 Product Complexity Ranking
Table 4: Product complexity ranking
Code Description Complexity
72 Computer & related services .4221271
32 Radio, television & communication equipment & apparatus .3798102
30 Office machinery & computers .3790194
40 Electrical energy, gas, steam & hot water .3515674
74 Other business services .3246673
29 Machinery & equipment n.e.c. .3113132
31 Electrical machinery & apparatus n.e.c. .3073564
50 Trade, maint. & repair services of motor vehicles & mtrcls; retail sale of auto fuel .3033172
33 Medical, precision & optical instruments, watches and clocks .3031925
92 Recreational, cultural & sporting services .2997497
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment .2878633
27 Basic metals .2786216
35 Other transport equipment .2748125
12 Uranium & thorium ores .266358
11 Crude petrol. & natural gas; services incidental to oil & gas ext. excl. surveying .2624262
34 Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers .2596836
24 Chemicals, chemical products & man-made fibres .2580898
23 Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuels .2537238
22 Printed matter & recorded media .2342544
10 Coal & lignite; peat .2317005
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. .2246486
13 Metal ores .2134478
25 Rubber & plastic products .205822
15 Food products & beverages .1978979
14 Other mining & quarrying products .1938014
26 Other non-metallic mineral products .1839178
20 Wood & products of wood & cork (excp. furniture); articles of straw & plaiting matls .1745415
17 Textiles .167882
19 Leather & leather products .1651444
21 Pulp, paper & paper products .1634918
18 Wearing apparel; furs .1262338
16 Tobacco products .1146149
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics (Intermediate Inputs Sample: 25077 Observations)
Mean Std. Dev.
Outsourcing Share 0.78 0.40
External Supplier With Tech. Sharing 0.02 0.12
External Supplier Without Tech. Sharing 0.76 0.41
IPRj 1.42 0.19
Compp 0.26 0.06
IPRj × Compp 0.37 0.10
Rule of Lawj 13.76 2.50
Corruptionj 0.93 1.60
Per Capita GDPj 10.13 0.47
Market Sizej 20.64 1.23
Distanceij 6.39 1.03
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A.2 The results including firm-specific variables
Table 8 presents the results based on an empirical model that includes specific effects at
the 3-digit sector levels. We substitute the firm-fixed effects with a set of firm-specific
factors for which we have information. The firm-level variable are identified in the litera-
ture to be important determinants of the outsourcing share (See the remarkably detailed
paper by Nunn and Trefler (2013)). We include the size of the firm, measured as the
total number of employees, its age, and its capital and skill intensity. The skill intensity
is measured as the number of skilled production workers in total employment.14 With
the exception of age, we take the logarithm one year lagged value of each variable.
Our results remain mostly robust. In particular, we find strong evidence that the
share of outsourcing of complex inputs is larger in countries with lower levels of IPR.
The direct effect of IPR is not statistically significant while the product complexity is
statistically negative. Turning to the firm-level variables, we find that older firms have
a statistically significant larger share of outsourcing. As argued by Bartel et al. (2008),
older firms might have had time to learn about the the quality and reliability of potential
foreign input suppliers. The size variable is also positive and significant meaning that
larger firms have a larger share of outsourcing. In line with the recent literature on the
choice between outsourcing and intra-firm trade, we find a negative impact of the capital
and skill intensities on the outsourcing share (Nunn and Trefler (2013)).
14We follow Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and define the skill groups according to the French Clas-
sification of Occupation and Social Categories. We divide these categories into six groups: executives,
technicians, intermediate administrative occupation, clerks, skilled production workers and unskilled pro-
duction workers. The share of skilled production workers is the ratio of the number of skilled production
workers to the total number of production workers.
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Table 8: Results including firm-specific variables
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6)
IPRj -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.046 -0.029 -0.035
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029)
Compp -0.209*** -0.201*** -0.187*** -0.195*** -0.010
(0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.067)
IPRj × Compp -0.453** -0.415* -0.619** -0.581***
(0.212) (0.213) (0.248) (0.201)
Rule of Lawj 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Corruptionj 0.004 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Per Capita GDPj 0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013)
Market Sizej 0.005 0.007** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Distanceij -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sizei 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Agei 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital Intensityi -0.006* -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Skill Intensityi -0.054*** -0.064***
(0.007) (0.006)
3-digit Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample Inputs Inputs Inputs Inputs Inputs Full
Observations 25,077 25,077 25,077 25,077 19,916 31,570
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.143 0.143 0.144 0.162 0.133
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-product identity. Standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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